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Abstract. Blockchains and other public ledger structures promise a new
way to create globally consistent event logs and other records. We make
use of this consistency property to detect and prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks in a key exchange such as Diffie-Hellman or ECDH. Essentially,
the MitM attack creates an inconsistency in the world views of the two
honest parties, and they can detect it with the help of the ledger. Thus,
there is no need for prior knowledge or trusted third parties apart from
the distributed ledger. To prevent impersonation attacks, we require user
interaction. It appears that, in some applications, the required user in-
teraction is reduced in comparison to other user-assisted key-exchange
protocols.
1 Introduction
Authentication is essential in any key exchange over insecure network. It helps
each party be certain that the exchanged key is in fact shared with the de-
sired second party, not an impostor. While authenticated key exchange has been
widely studied, it is still a task with many complications. Most of the existing
key-exchange protocols require some root of trust between the involved parties,
such as prior knowledge on a cryptographic key or password [9,11,15,20,23,40],
or trusted third-parties (TTP) [14,34]. In situations where these roots of trust
are not available, such as device pairing, key exchanges usually rely on user
interaction to achieve authentication [5,9,17,21,22,26,38]. The probability of a
successful attack against these protocols mostly depends on the entropy of the
user input. While more complex inputs bring higher security level, they might
also cause usability issues.
To ease the requirements of a secure key exchange, we find the solution in
blockchains and similar public ledger structures, which provide a new way to
publish information and achieve consistency in a distributed system. They have
been used as key directories that store bindings between identities and public
keys [1,24,29,41]. In a public-key-based key exchange, a party can look up for
the public key of the other in these directories. While these systems provide a
reasonable user experience and do not depend on any single TTP, they restrict
a party to use only the registered keys and thus, complicate key management.
Furthermore, they require all interested parties to have a well-defined and unique
identity, which does not always hold in reality. For example, two mobile devices
of the same user may share the same identity, such as the user’s email address,
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or they may be identified simply by their presence in the user’s hands. In any
case, the key-identity binding requires the user or someone else to register the
bindings.
In this paper, we present a new family of key exchange protocols that utilizes
the global consistency property of the public ledgers. We refer to the protocols
as the public-ledger-based (PLB) protocols. The idea is to bring transparency to
a key exchange by publishing its parameters into the public ledgers. This en-
ables the communication parties to check whether they are participating in the
same key exchange, thereby detecting man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. Our
protocols do not require any roots of trust between the parties or key-identifier
bindings. In cases where the parties have public identifiers, such as phone num-
bers or emails, MitM attacks are prevented without any user interaction. When
public identifiers are not available, our protocols still require the users to act as
an out-of-band channel. However, the amount of information conveyed via the
out-of-band channel is not a function of the desired security level. Thus, high
security level can be achieved with little user interaction. Of course, instead of
being MitM, the attacker could perform an impersonation attack against one of
the parties. We will present application-specific solutions to the attack.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 covers the back-
ground about public ledgers. Section 3 gives an overview of our solution, and
Section 4 describes the PLB protocols in detail. Section 5 presents a number of
practical applications of the protocols. Section 6 discusses the denial-of-service
attacks against the protocols and the privacy issues and presents some solutions.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
This section covers the literature about public ledgers and the threat model that
we consider in this paper.
2.1 Public ledger
The recent widely known compromises of popular service providers [2,3,4] and
government surveillances [16,18,28] have motivated quite a few proposals for
public ledgers that have no centralized management. These public ledgers are
basically public logs of events with the following properties [12]: immutability
and global consistency of the event history, inclusiveness in the sense that all
valid data is included. The ledgers might also define a linear order or have some
built-in concept of time on all data entries.
Two main architectures have emerged for the public ledgers [13]: (1) totally
distributed with no central points of trust or (2) more centralized with one
untrusted third party who manages the ledger’s content and several trusted
auditors who audits its behaviors.
Distributed ledgers. The most prominent representative of the distributed
ledgers is Bitcoin [30]. In Bitcoin, an open peer-to-peer (P2P) network with no
2
single party responsible for any critical operation maintains an append-only log
of transactions, called blockchain. Transactions take place between public keys
and are communicated as signed messages in the P2P network. They are mined
into blocks approximately every ten minutes. Global consistency is achieved
by compressing the global history of transactions into one cryptographic hash
value, which can relatively easily be agreed on and communicated to everyone.
Inclusiveness and immutability are guaranteed by a novel distributed consensus
mechanism and a competitive mining process.
The Bitcoin’s blockchain has become a reliable log for many other applica-
tions, such as CommitCoin [4], Factom1, Proof of Existence2, Virtual notary3,
and Tierion4. It has also inspired hundreds of alternative cryptocurrencies, such
as Ethereum [39] and Namecoin [24]. A number of central banks and financial
institutions have started investing in Bitcoin-based technologies [7,35,31].
Centralized ledgers. Although Bitcoin and its variants have achieved a
large degree of success, the decentralized nature limits their ability to achieve
widespread adoption. The reason is that, for the systems to be completely trust-
less, users must store the entire blockchain locally and track its progress. Thus,
the amount of storage and communication traffic that they require increases
linearly with the number of users.
To address the shortcomings of the blockchain, more centralized ledger ar-
chitectures have been proposed in the literature, in which the ledger content is
maintained by an untrusted third party instead of the P2P network. They rely
on trusted auditors to achieve the desired properties.
Most of the proposals in this category are for monitoring security of the web
PKI. Certificate Transparency (CT) [27] is a public log of all web certificates,
which aims to bring transparency and accountability to the CA operations. The
log is structured as an append-only Merkle tree, in which new records are added
to the right of the tree. Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [25] and its kin
[8,37] are similar solutions, but they deploy an ordered Merkle tree, where the
data in the leaf nodes is sorted by the domain name instead. Both append-
only and ordered Merkle trees enable logarithmic-size proofs of existence and
non-existence for certificates, though. In yet another variant of these ideas, PKI
Safety Net [36] enables verification of both the issuing time order and the non-
existence of records for a domain by maintaining two trees that are similar to
those in CT and AKI, respectively. Independent monitors maintain a copy of
the trees and audit their consistency.
Apart from web PKI, centralized ledger solutions have been suggested for
other applications. CONIKS [29] constructs directories of user certificates. DECIM
[41] keeps track of uses of a public key in a transparency log so that its owner can
detect key misuse. Enhanced Certificate Transparency [33] extends CT to handle
certificate revocation and shows how this extension can be used in end-to-end
1 https://www.factom.com/
2 https://proofofexistence.com/
3 https://virtual-notary.org/
4 https://tierion.com/
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email or messaging systems. Bui et al. [12] apply public ledgers to group man-
agement in distributed systems where entities are represented by their public
keys and authorization is in the form of signed certificates.
In this paper, we are not proposing any new ledger structure. Instead, we
assume that a public ledger with the properties mentioned above exists and we
use it as an abstract to build our key exchange protocols.
2.2 Threat model
We consider a threat model where there are active attackers against key ex-
changes. The attackers can perform man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks to inter-
cept the communication traffic or impersonation attacks to pretend to be one of
the involved parties. They can also perform denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to
cause failures to key exchanges.
We assume that all the underlying cryptography is secure. Also, the commu-
nication channel between any party and the ledger, if exists, is secured under
existing security protocols such as TLS/SSL.
3 Basic idea
The key observation that motivated this work is that in a key exchange that is
free of MitM, the endpoints have a consistent view of the key exchange’s param-
eters (i.e. the public keys of the endpoints or the shared key). Suppose that when
Alice wants to establish a shared key with Bob, Carol performs a MitM attack
to intercept the communication. If Carol succeeds, there will be two different
key exchanges — one between Alice and Carol and the other between Carol and
Bob, as illustrated in Figure 1. A secure connection, on the other hand, involves
only a single key exchange. In other words, the MitM attack creates inconsistent
views of the key exchange between Alice and Bob, while in the case of a secure
key exchange, their views are consistent.
Fig. 1. A secure key exchange (on the left) vs a key exchange with MitM attacker (on
the right)
Based on the above observation, our proposal for detecting MitM attacks
against any unauthenticated key exchange is to publish its parameters to a public
4
ledger. Let us assume such a ledger exists and (unrealistically) that there is only
one legitimate key exchange taking place in the world ever. After the unauthen-
ticated key exchange, one of the parties (e.g., the initiator) sends an event E
containing the key exchange’s data to the ledger, which can be, for example, a
hash of the public keys or a hash of the shared key. When the ledger has made
the event public, the parties separately query the ledger to check how many new
events were entered into the ledger. If there is only one and it matches their
view of the key exchange, the key exchange was secure. On the other hand, if
two or more events were entered, there may be a MitM attacker around and
both parties must discard the results of the key exchange.
Context. The scheme described above is impractical because it supports only
one key exchange ever. To enable multiple key exchanges, our first attempt is to
amend the key-exchange event E with a context C. The data submitted to the
public ledger will be 〈C,E〉 and it is indexed by C. That is, one side submits this
data to the ledger, both sides query it with the index C, and then they compare
the received event E (if there is only one) with their view of the key exchange.
The context can be any information that the two parties agree on naturally
or out of band. The following information is particularly suitable to be used in
C:
– application identifier a,
– endpoint identifier i if one is already known to the other party,
– user input or user-compared code c.
The first and second elements are examples of natural contexts, while the
last is an example of out-of-band contexts. A key exchange can use both natural
context and out-of-band context. How much information the context should
hold depends on how many parties are simultaneously writing to the ledger.
The frequency of collisions for the index C should be sufficiently small to not
frustrate the users.
Time window. We can see that by tagging each key exchange event with a
context, once a context is used, it cannot be re-used for any other key exchange.
To optimize the solution, we tag an event E not only with a context C but also
with a time t. This way, we can do one key exchange per context per time period
τ . Defining the time period is application-specific, and it must be agreed by the
two parties in advance. An application, for example, can define that a context
can be used once per minute or per hour.
We can consider time t as a part of the context C. However, it must be
provided by the ledger because we cannot trust the communication parties to
timestamp the key exchange events. Thus, the ledger must have a built-in con-
cept of time. In Bitcoin, for example, a new block appears every ten minutes;
thus, we can roughly determine the timestamp of a block by checking how many
blocks are after it in the block chain.
Figure 2 illustrates an overview of the protocol with the addition of the
context and the time period. The data submitted to the ledger will be 〈C,E〉
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Fig. 2. An overview of the public-ledger-based key exchange protocol
and it is timestamped by the ledger. When each party checks the ledger, they
only query for events with context C that happened in the time period τ . The
parties reject the key exchange if there is more than one events that matches
this query or if the retrieved event E does not match theirs.
4 Public-ledger-based key exchange
We now describe our PLB key exchange protocols in detail. We will start with
a protocol where the communication parties agree on a context out of band and
user interaction is required for the agreement. We will then build on it a protocol
where the two communication parties must naturally agree on a context with
each other and no user interaction is involved.
4.1 Public-ledger-based key exchange with out-of-band context
Since the PLB key exchange protocol with out-of-band context requires user
interaction, we require the communication parties to be equipped with the fol-
lowing: (1) a screen that can display a string, and (2) a “start” button where
users can press to trigger an event.
The protocol involves four parties: the initiator A, the responder B, the ledger
L, and the user U . It consists of six phases as follows.
1. Unauthenticated key exchange: In the first phase, the parties perform
an unauthenticated key exchange to establish a shared secret key SK.
2. Context acquirement: The initator A requests the ledger for a context
that is not in use. The ledger then returns a context C that matches the
query. A then sends the context to B using the shared key. (An alternative
way to acquire a context is for one party to generate it locally and try to
use it. This way, depending on the entropy of the context, collision might
happen, causing failure in the protocol.)
3. Context comparison: A and B display the context C on their screen so
that user U can compare the context. If they display the same context, U
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presses “start” on both endpoints at the same time. After that, both parties
immediately query the ledger to get the current ledger’s time. Let SA and
SB be the ledger’s times that A and B receive, respectively.
4. Commitment: A commits the key exchange to the ledger. It submits an
event E containing the key exchange’s parameters along with the context C
to the ledger. The ledger then stores E and indexes it by C. It also gives the
event a timestamp t. If for some reason (e.g., network failures) the submission
fails, A aborts the protocol and informs B about the abortion. Otherwise,
A informs B that the commitment was successful via the encrypted channel
established in the previous phase.
5. Commitment verification: When the ledger has published the event in
the previous phase, both parties separately query the ledger for events with
context C. A queries for events that happened only in period [SA −4, QA],
and B queries for events that happened only in period [SB −4, QB ], where
QA and QB are the times when A and B make the query, respectively, and4
is an application-specific constant that represents the possible difference in
clocks between A and B. The ledger then returns a list of events that match
the query and a proof that the list is complete. For each event in the list,
the ledger also returns the respective timestamp. The parties verify the list.
They abort if any of the following occurs: (1) the verification fails, (2) more
than one event appear in the list, or (3) the only event in the list does not
match their view. Otherwise, the protocol succeeds and the parties accept
the shared key.
6. Confirmation: User U checks that the protocol succeeds on both sides. It
it fails on either side, the user must abort the protocol.
Fig. 3. Ledger’s timeline of events for a PLB protocol using out-of-band context
Figure 3 illustrates all the events in the key exchange above in the ledger’s
timeline. We can see that if there is man in the middle, the party who queries
last (B in the figure) will see that there are two key exchanges with the same
context C and thus, abort the protocol. Impersonation attack is also not possible
because the user will check that the protocol succeeds on both sides.
A notable property of the protocol is that its security level does not depend on
the entropy of the context. In order for the protocol to succeed, each key exchange
simply needs a unique context during its time period. How much information
the context should hold depends only on how many parties are simultaneously
writing to the ledger.
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4.2 Public-ledger-based key exchange with natural context
In many cases, the user cannot be present at both sides to press the “start”
button as in the previous protocol. However, the communication parties in these
cases usually have a public identifier that is already known to each other. For
example, in an encrypted phone call, the identifiers are the phone numbers or the
email addresses. These identifiers can form a context on which the parties can
naturally agree with each other. This section will present the PLB key exchange
when a natural context is available. This protocol is more simple but requires
more assumptions than the previous does because there is no user interaction.
The PLB key exchange with natural context involves three entities: the ini-
tiator A, the responder B, and the ledger L. Beside a context C, the initiator
and the responder need to agree with each other on the following parameters in
advance:
– A time period’s length w, which indicates that a context can only be used
once in a time period of length w. The first time period of a day starts at
00:00. We assume that the local clocks of the communication parties must be
synchronized with reliable sources, and w must be larger than the difference
between these clocks.
– A timeout α, which indicates the maximum duration of a key exchange.
These parameters can be pre-configured in the communication application.
This way, by using the same application to communicate with each other, the
two parties naturally agree on the parameters.
The protocol consists of three phases: unauthenticated key exchange, com-
mitment, and commitment verification. The details of each phase are as follows.
1. Unauthenticated key exchange: As in the previous protocol, the parties
first perform an unauthenticated key exchange to establish a shared secret
key SK. Suppose that the current time period is [t0, t0 +w] and the current
time is t. The parties can only perform the unauthenticated key exchange if
t is not within [t0, t0 + α] or [t0 + w − α, t0 + w]. This is to ensure that the
key exchange does not span over two time periods. Let SA and SB be the
times when the key exchange starts on A and B, respectively. A will abort
the protocol if it does not finish by time SA + α, and B will do so by time
SB + α.
2. Commitment: The initator A submits an event E containing the key ex-
change’s parameters along with the context C to the ledger. The ledger
then stores E and indexes it by C. It also gives the event a timestamp t.
If for some reason (e.g., network failures) the submission fails, A aborts the
protocol and informs B about the abortion. Otherwise, A informs B that
the commitment was successful via the encrypted channel established in the
previous phase.
3. Commitment verification: When the ledger has published the event in
the previous phase, both parties separately query the ledger for all events
with context C in the current period. The ledger then returns a list of events
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that match the query and a proof that the list is complete. For each event in
the list, the ledger also returns the respective timestamp. The parties verify
the list. They abort if any of the following occurs: (1) the verification fails,
(2) more than one event appear in the list, or (3) the only event in the list
does not match their view. Otherwise, the protocol succeeds and the parties
accept the shared key.
The protocol described above can prevent MitM attacks as follows. Assuming
that there is a MitM attacker, the attacker must perform a separate key exchange
with each party. However, the two key exchanges must share the same context C.
With time synchronization and the timeout, we ensure that the communication
parties perform the key exchange in the same time period. Thus, at least one of
the parties will see two key exchanges with the same context published in the
ledger and abort the protocol.
We can see that instead of being the MitM, the attacker could perform an
impersonation attack against one of the honest parties (and denial-of-service
against the other if necessary). Then, one party will be see the expected one
key exchange in the ledger while the other will not even check. We will present
application-specific solution to detect impersonation in the next section.
5 Applications
We now consider a number of practical applications of the PLB key exchange
protocol.
5.1 Encrypted VoIP
We first present the most convincing application of the protocol — encrypted
voice over IP (VoIP), such as Cryptophone5, SilentPhone6, and Signal7.
In these applications, each user is typically represented by a public-key pair,
and the users use these key pairs to establish end-to-end encrypted phone calls.
To verify that they are actually communicating with the parties they intend, the
users can rely on trusted authorities who vouch for the users’ public keys, such as
the certificate authority in the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. A major issue
with trusted authorities is that they can vouch for fraudulent keys in an attack
[3,2]. An alternative approach is that the users perform key verification out of
band. A common approach for key verification is to compare key fingerprint, i.e.
some representation of a cryptographic hash of the public keys. Key fingerprint
comparison introduces severe usability because users have to manually perform
key verification before communicating with a new partner. Shorter strings can
be provided instead to simplify the verification [10,42]. A short authentication
5 http://www.cryptophone.de/
6 https://www.silentcircle.com/
7 https://whispersystems.org/
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string (SAS) is a truncated cryptographic hash of the key exchange’s parameters,
which is usually represented by a human-friendly format. Participants compute
the SAS based on the key exchange they observe and compare the resulting
value by reading it aloud. The authentication is based on recognition of the
other party’s voice.
The PLB key exchange protocol can be applied readily to encrypted VoIP
and improve the usability. Specifically, the parties perform the protocol with
the context being the phone numbers (or user IDs). This context is inherent
to both parties; thus, no out-of-band channel is needed for context verification.
The use of the public ledger prevents MitM attacks, and the users will naturally
start speaking secrets only if they recognize each other’s voices. Therefore, the
protocol achieves the same level of security as the SAS verification approach’s
but better usability because no user interaction is required.
Of course, users who have never heard each other’s voice cannot rely on our
protocol to establish a secure phone channel (same as with the SAS verification
solution). Voice spoofing is also an issue of voice-based authentication [19,32].
Thus, we do not aim to completely replace the stronger methods of authentica-
tion, such as manual key fingerprint verification, but to complement them.
There have been attempts to publish bindings between user identities and
public keys to public ledgers [1,24,29,41]. The main difference between these
solutions to ours is that they restrict a party to use only the registered keys and
thus, complicate key management. Our protocol, on the other hand, allows users
to use arbitrary key pair for each communication, making the use of multiple
devices with separate keys easier.
5.2 Device pairing
Device pairing — the procedure of establishing a shared key for secure commu-
nication between two devices — is another application of the PLB protocol. In
device pairing, there is usually no key management infrastructure or pre-shared
secret between the devices. Thus, authentication solely depends on some form
of user action, such as entering a passkey [9,17,21] or verifying numeric code
[5,22,26,38]. The security level of these approaches depend on the entropy of the
user input. In Bluetooth, for example, users have to compare six digits displayed
on the devices and the probability of a successful attack is 10−6. Using longer
or more complex inputs would be more error-prone and reduce usability.
The PLB key exchange protocol might offer advantages other the existing
solutions in this scenario. The devices can run the PLB key exchange protocol
with out-of-band context, and the users compare the context displayed on the
devices. If they are equal, the key exchange succeeds with impossibility of MitM
attacks, regardless of the entropy of the context.
The protocol can be applied to group association where more than two devices
want to establish secure communication with each other.
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6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss denial-of-service attacks against the PLB protocols as
well as their privacy issues.
6.1 Denial-of-service
We have showed how the PLB key exchange protocols can defend against MitM
and impersonation attacks. Another security vector to the protocols is the denial-
of-service attacks where the attacker spams events to the ledger. This could
prevent key exchanges to succeed because the endpoints could observe several
key exchanges with the same context as theirs in the ledger and drop the key
exchange as a result. In this section, we will analyze the causes of these attacks
and how we can mitigate them.
The PLB key exchanges using natural contexts are attractive targets of DoS
attacks. It is due to the fact that natural contexts are usually endpoint identifiers,
which are known by everyone. To permanently prevent any pair of parties to
communicate, an attacker can determine the context based on their identifiers
and continuously send fake events with the context to the ledger. A solution for
this type of targeted attacks is for the ledger to authenticate endpoint identifiers.
Authentication could be easily adopted by centralized ledgers like Certificate
Transparency. Also, the service provider can act as the ledger provider itself;
thus, users can use the same credentials for the application and ledger.
The out-of-band contexts might also be guessed if their entropy is low. Thus,
they must be random so that it is difficult to guess by the attackers but not
too complex for users to compare. Using the ledger-provided contexts as in our
protocol can limit the attack to some extent but cannot prevent massive spam-
ming. Limitation on rate of submissions, posting fee (e.g. the transaction fee in
Bitcoin), and proof-of-work of clients (e.g. client puzzels [6]), are some solutions
to prevent massive spamming.
The ledger might be the source of context leak. Depending on the ledger’s
architecture, the attackers can read the contexts immediately when new events
are entered the ledger and then post fake events with the same contexts. The
blockchain with P2P network is an example of such designs, in which transactions
are propagated through the network for a while before they are mined into blocks.
Thus, to prevent context leak, the ledger could be designed so that it can only
be queried for individual contexts and and the response for any individual query
leaks no information about other events in the ledger. CONIKS’s [29] is an
example of such design. The ledger could also be round-based, meaning that
events can be accepted in a round and only published in the next round.
6.2 Privacy
We now argue about the privacy issue of the PLB protocol that uses the commu-
nication parties’ identifiers as the context. It is true that if a record is published
in the ledger every time two parties communicate with each other, the protocol
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has serious privacy issue. However, that is not how applications work in prac-
tice. Two communication parties need to perform a key exchange only once and
save the result locally for later uses. They do not have to perform another key
exchange unless one of them changes its public key. Authentication also helps
to prevent privacy issues. For example, a party can only query the ledger for
the records that are associated with contexts containing its identifier. Further-
more, unlike ledgers that store key bindings, the content of our ledger can be
erased periodically without affecting any key exchanges. This not only reduces
the footprint of the ledger but also might be of little help in preserving user
privacy.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to have authenticated key exchange proto-
cols that take advantages of the global consistency property of blockchains and
other public ledgers to detect and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. While our
protocol requires the users to act as an out-of-band channel, the amount of in-
formation conveyed out of band is not a function of the desired security level.
Instead, it depends on the number of simultaneous key exchanges and thus, on
the load of the public ledger; the out-of-band information simply ensures each key
exchange gets its unique context string. Further work is required on the detailed
requirements and design of the public ledger and on analysis of denial-of-service
threats.
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